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Introduction 
A recurring theme of corporate governance is the accountability of directors and executives to 
their shareholders. Corporate governance seems to evade exact definition, but one useful 
description is that it consists of the control mechanisms available for ensuring that managers 
and directors do not abuse their corporate powers.1 An earlier attempt at definition was 
made by Sir Adrian Cadbury (as he then was) who suggested in his report that corporate 
governance was about the way in which companies were managed and run.2 Since the early 
1930's some commentators have even suggested that directors and managers have tended 
to become, inter alia, self-serving,3 tending to ignore shareholders (and even the wider 
community)4 altogether. 
This article will consider the recent implementation of an EU Directive that may underline 
such accountability in the context of listed companies (i.e. those subject to the UK Listing 
Authorities jurisdiction). Statutory intervention in the past has sought to underline 
accountability by empowering shareholders to call meetings of the company (general 
meetings). In England and Wales we have also chosen to support accountability by the use of 
Codes.5 The use of such Codes, rather than statutory intervention, may be seen as an 
unusual approach in a mixed-economy, such as the British one, where governments have 
been prepared to intervene by statutory means. Codes may be considered to be part of so-
called “light-touch” regulation. Company legislation in the past has provided some direct 
support for accountability, notably the Companies Act 1948,6 and the Companies Act 1985.7  
 
A right to demand a meeting: the Companies Act 2006  
Section 303 of the 2006 Act follows its two immediate predecessors by giving members the 
power to require directors to call a meeting.8 Section 303 (2) stipulates a “required 
percentage” of shares that a member (i.e. a shareholder) must have in order to demand such 
a meeting, as 10 per cent of the paid up share capital of the company carrying the right to 
vote. But does putting such a right into shareholders' *Cov. L.J. 29  hands ensure strong 
accountability? Could a minimum of 10 per cent prove too high a bar to climb over? 
One problem some shareholders encounter in using this right stems from the small size of 
their holdings, and the need to find like-minded shareholders, so that meetings can be forced 
on unwilling directors by using s.303(1); how can just one shareholder coerce those of a 
similar disposition so as to require the calling of a meeting? A contrary view is that such 
minority shareholders should not be able to overrule the majority and that on acquiring their 
shares all shareholders are buying into a form of democracy, where the majority view should 
prevail. If the minority could continually impose their view how could the company ever 
progress? In any event, in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate 9 it was decided that the 
company, as a body of shareholders, cannot override the views of the directors. They have, 
in effect, delegated the power of management to the directors'. Or as Buckley LJ put it: 
“the directors are not servants…they are not agents appointed by and bound to serve the 
shareholders as their principals. They are the persons who may by the regulations [the 
articles of association] be entrusted with control of the business…”10  
 
A little more power to the people: the Companies (Shareholders' Rights) 
Regulations 200911 (“the regulations”)  
The regulations,12 by implementing EU directive 2007/36/EC and thereby amending Part 13 
of the 2006 Act, provide that the minimum threshold in s.303(2) in order for shareholders to 
require directors to convene a meeting, is now only 5 per cent. Section 4 of the regulations 
amends s.303 by substituting 5 per cent for “…the required percentage…” contained in 
s.303(2) and also deletes sub-section (3) - which specified the 10 per cent rule, thereby 
somewhat simplifying the section. To further strengthen the right to demand a meeting, 
s.304 imposes a duty on directors to actually call the required meeting within 21 days of the 
shareholder request, and then hold it within 28 days of the notice calling the meeting. 
 
The purpose of the regulations  
Apparently the purpose is twofold:13 to improve shareholder accountability; and to harmonise 
shareholder voting rights across EU member states. In particular they ensure that a 
shareholder residing in one member state has a straightforward means of voting when the 
general meeting is held in another member state. The second aim seems laudable enough, 
but will the first improve shareholder accountability that is the desired outcome of better 
corporate governance? 
To put the question another way, will this new provision inspire shareholders (who may be 
better described as owners) to demand a meeting be called, rather than just *Cov. L.J. 30  
exit the company by disposing of their shares? It is to be hoped that a 5 per cent threshold 
will mean that notwithstanding the difficulties imposed by wide shareholder dispersal, fewer 
shareholders will now hesitate before challenging corporate management. Two features 
remain however. First, institutional shareholders, by the sheer weight of their holdings, could 
make any attempt at passing resolutions, deemed by them to be unattractive, look futile, and 
so considerably dampen any enthusiasm for calling a meeting in the first place. Secondly, 
recent evidence of the commercial behaviour by some British banks would seem to suggest 
that our Codes, on which so much corporate governance hope is pinned, are not working. The 
Cadbury Code 1992 (incorporated into the Combined Code 2008) makes non executive 
directors the key to corporate governance. Likewise, the Higgs review introduced a 
requirement for a senior independent director to be appointed amongst the non-executives. A 
possibly simplistic view is that on the evidence of the recent, and widely- felt, bank 
insolvencies, these two codified requirements have not been able to hold wrong-headed 
management and executives to account. 
 
Conclusion  
It is simply too much to hope that the amendment to s.303, by using a reduction from 10 to 
5 per cent, will have much impact, given the scale of the problem (as possibly evidenced by 
some banks). Moreover, there is precious little evidence that those shareholders were 
minded to demand meetings to call directors to account, nor that non-executive directors 
were any more watchful of shareholder interests than their executive counterparts. 
Those companies that desire a UK listing are required to either comply with the Combined 
Code or explain (the so-called comply or explain dichotomy) why they do not comply, and are 
subject to the continuing obligations of the UK Listing Authority. Given that the Listing 
Authority in the UK is actually the Financial Services Authority,14 there is precious little 
current evidence that the Code is working, or that a simple reduction from 10 to 5 per cent 
will put greater accountability in the hands of shareholders. It is suggested that what is really 
needed is a considered change in the juridical nature of the relationship between owners and 
directors, ideally one that makes directors more accountable than Buckley LJ countenanced. 
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